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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Religious Education-Validity of
Released Time Programs. In 1948 the Supreme Court (8-1) held invalid under the
14th Amendment a system adopted by the Illinois Board of Education which permitted
students, on written request of their parents, to be released during regular school
hours for religious instruction or devotion in the public school buildings. McCollum v.
Board of Education 333 U.S. 203, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1338 (1948). Under these so-called
"released time" plans, non-participating children remain in the classroom and continue
some form of secular study. Since the majority opinion in the McCollum case relied in
part upon the metaphorical "wall of separation between Church and State," an uncer-
tain test was provided for the future disposition of systems distinguishable from that
involved in the Illinois case. The constitutional vice in the McCollum plan could have
been the use of public money and property for religious purposes, or more broadly, the
coercive effect of the plan in that the children released from the classroom routine to
the religious services were still satisfying the statutory obligation to attend school.
Last year the Supreme Court was again faced with the problem and clarified the
holding of the McCollum case, holding (6-3) that a released time program in New
York which provided for religious instruction off the public school grounds, and
involved no public expense, was not violative of the Federal Constitution. Justice
Douglas, for the majority, held that although the 14th Amendment prohibits the states
from establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise, the particular program
involved was not such that it violated either of these guaranties. Coercion in fact in
administration was retained as a possible ground for holding released time plans
invalid, but the majority found no evidence of any coercion in the record. The McCol-
lum case was expressly affirmed but was summarily distinguished since there the
program involved public expenditure. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Dissenting Justices Black and Jackson saw coercion in the plan and Justice Frank-
furter labeled it "use of the public schools as the instrument for security of attendance
at denominational classes." The vigor alone of the dissenting opinions indicates that the
problem is far from settled.
Washington at the present time does not have statutory authorization for released
time religious education, possibly because of the Washington Constitution, Art. 1 § 11:
".... No public money or property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment ;" and
more particularly Art. IX § 4: ". . . All schools maintained or supported wholly or in
part by the public funds small be forever free from sectarian control or influence."
The applicability of these sections to released time plans has of course not been
resolved by the Washington court. In State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369,
173 Pac. 35 (1918) a resolution of the Everett Board of Education which allowed high
school credit for Bible study done at home was found violative of Art. I § 11 because
of the admittedly small public expense for salaries of teachers who examined the stu-
dents in the subject of study. A program similar to that in Zorach would meet this
objection since no public funds are expended.
The more serious objection to released time in Washington is found in certain lan-
guage in Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wn. 2d 699, 207 P. 2d 198 (1949).
Plaintiffs, whose children attended a private religious school brought mandamus
against the school district to force it to furnish transportation to their children, citing
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RCW 28.24.060 EREm. Surp. 1945 § 4719-1] which permitted all students of public or
private schools to use the ".... transportation facilities provided by the school district
in which they reside." Although the U.S. Supreme Court had already found such
statutes not violative of the Federal Constitution, Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Steinert, speaking for the majority and denying the writ, noted
that the Washington Constitution is stricter than the Federal Constitution, and that
Art. I § 11 and Art. IX § 4 of the Washington Constitution presented a "clear denial
of the rights asserted." A determination of the constitutionality of released time plans
in Washington schools would require separate consideration of precisely what consti-
tutes "sectarian influence" within the prohibition of Art. IX § 4. The Visser opinion
dealt with the question of what constitutes support of an admittedly sectarian school,
and therefore offers no help here.
However, Art. IX § 2 ("... But the entire revenue derived from the common
school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the
support of the common schools") has provided additional support for the decisions
denying transportation rights to students of religious schools, but would have no appli-
cation to a provision like the one in the Zorach case involving only the question of
released time.
In any event, the rule thus far is merely that the Zorach type program does not
violate the Federal Constitution. The Washington Constitution could present another
hurdle for the local advocates of this type of religious training.
RAYmoND H. SinEnus
Taxation-Prizes for Artistic or Scholastic Accomplishments-Gifts or Income?
P won $25,000 for the best symphony entered in a contest sponsored by a philan-
thropist. P composed his symphony during a three year period, 1936 to 1939, entered
the contest and won the prize in 1947. The sponsor of the award derived no profit
from the contest nor from P's participation in it. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue ruled that the entire award was taxable as income and under I.R.C. § 107(b),
to be computed as though the award had been ratably received over the three year
period ending with 1947. P filed a claim for refund on the ground that the prize con-
stituted a gift under I.R.C. § 22(b) (3) which excludes gift from gross income as
defined under I.R.C. § 22(a). The district court held that it was a gift. Robertson
v .U.S., 93 F. Supp. 660 (D. Utah 1950). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the award was taxable as income. U.S. v. Robertson, 190 F. 2d 680 (C.A. 10th
1951). Certiorari granted because of a conflict between this case and McDermott v.
Commissioner, 150 F. 2d 585 (App. D.C. 1945). Held: Affirmed. Acceptance by
contestants of the offer tendered by the sponsor of a prize contest creates an enforceable
contract. Payment of the prize offered to the winner, of the contest is the discharge
of a contractual obligation and therefore not excludable from gross income as
property received as a gift. Robertson v. U.S., 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
The taxability of a prize is determined by Sections 22(a) and 22(b) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 22(a) provides, "Gross income includes gaifis, profits
and income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service . . .
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid. . . ." Section 22(b) provides, "The
following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from
taxation under this chapter: ... (3) ... The value of property acquired by gift .....
If the award is compensation for personal services, it is taxable; if it is a gift,
it is exempt.
This is the first ruling of the Supreme Court in this area. The broad doctrine
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